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THE ENVIRONMENTAL CLASS ACTION AFTER SNYDER AND
ZAHN: OBTAINING FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
OVER THE CLASS THROUGH APPLICATION
OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
JEFFREY D. LAVENHAR
It is precisely because the class action deters the robber barons from
plundering the poor that it has been hailed as a very important supplement to law enforcement. Take away the class action and the joy of
those who live off the small consumer will, as in the bad old days, be
unconfined.'
In the growing area of environmental litigation it has become increasingly
useful to be able to bring a single action on behalf of a large number of persons whose claims are separate and distinct, yet are based upon common
issues of law and fact. The original Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure identified a prototype of such a single action, the "spurious" class
action. 2 This original class action rule proved cumbersome, however, due
largely to the ambiguous categories of classes that it created. 3 In 1966 Rule
23 was completely rewritten, and those classes previously designated "spuri4
ous" were legitimized as full-fledged class actions under the rule.
1. Letter from A.L. Pomerantz to the Financial Editor, N.Y. Times, April 25,
1971, § 3, at 22, col. 8. This letter was in response to an article by M. Handler, Massive
Class Actions: A Liability, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1971, § 3, at 12, cols. 3-8. See also
Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1971).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) (1937). This rule has been superceded by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b) (3), adopted by the 1966 amendments.
3. For a discussion of the original version of Rule 23 and the problems encountered
therein, see 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1752
(1972); COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ADVISORY NOTE, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966)
[hereinafter
cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE]; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,
376-86 (1968).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 presently provides:
CLASS ACTIONS
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law
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or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would
as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect
their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the contioversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C)
the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the
particular foium; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management
of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice;
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained.
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him
from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance
through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided
in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and
whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall
then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the
presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given
in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any step
in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of
members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to
intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3)
imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring
that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing with
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It is generally agreed that amended Rule 23 is a rule of convenience designed to "achieve economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated .

.

.

.. ,Major

purposes

ascribed to the rule include the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and the
prevention of inconsistent or varying adjudications of identical or related controversies. 6 Thus, the effect of the rule should be to provide uniform and
7
binding adjudication for a number of similarly situated plaintiffs.
The new rule established the machinery for resolving a large number of
distinct but related claims in a single federal action; first, however, it must
be established that the claim comes within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the court. Consequently, since actions brought under the Federal Rules must
comply with the usual federal jurisdictional requirements,8 the $10,000 jurisdictional amount must be met in class actions based on a federal question 9
or diversity of citizenship. 10 Liberal interpretation of the new rule is suggested by reason of the economies it is designed to achieve," but unfortusimilar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order under Rule
16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the
court directs.
Since the 1966 amended versions of Rule 23(b)(3) and (c)(2) provide that the appearing representatives of the class bind the non-appearing class members, it is incorrect
and confusing to continue calling such a class "spurious." See Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 395 n.150 (1968). Many courts, however, continue to use
the term.
A class action may be brought if, in addition to the requirements of numerous members, common issues of law and fact, and fair and accurate representation,
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3).
5. ADvisoRy COMMrITEE NOTE 102-103. See also Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81
HARY. L. REV. 356, 390 (1968).

6. ADvisoRY COMMITEE NOTE 99. See also Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:
Some Problems in Class Actions, 9"BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 435-37 (1960).
7. Mungin v. Florida E.C. Ry., 318 F. Supp. 720, 730 (M.D. Fla. 1970), af!'d per
curiam, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides that "[t]hese rules shall not be construed to extend
or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts. .... "
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Of course, some federal questions have independent
jurisdictional bases without an amount requirement. See C. WRiGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 32, at 108 n.12-27 (2d ed. 1970).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
11. The enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 provided for
liberal joinder of parties and claims. The Rules broadened the traditional concept of
a single triable "case or controversy" by allowing all parties and all claims related to
the main action to be joined in one case. Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 370 (N.D.
Iowa 1959). In the environmental sphere, a recent Supreme Court decision indicated
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nately its potential in the environmental sphere has been significantly curtailed by two recent Supreme Court decisions, Snyder v. Harris1 and Zahn
1
v. InternationalPaper Co. 3

In Snyder the Court held that despite the liberal refashioning of Rule 23,
class members may not aggregate the amounts of their claims in diversity actions to satisfy the $10,000 jurisdictional minimum 14 unless they share a
common and undivided interest. 15 It is unlikely that such an interest will
exist in environmental litigation since the class members are usually property
owners who have sustained degrees of injury which vary according to the
amount of property each owns and its distance from the source of the
damage.
The practical effect of Snyder on class actions seeking damages is to fence
all but the unusually large "small claimants" out of the federal courts. 1 6 The
class action for injunctive relief, on the other hand, remains viable and will
validly serve the needs of many plaintiffs with small claims who are willing
to forego damages if a source of pollution can be shut down.1 7 Nevertheless,
the overall effect of Snyder frustrates the potential of amended Rule 23.
The Zahn decision extended the ruling in Snyder by requiring that all members of the class in a diversity suit must present a jurisdictionally proper claim;
that is, each must either have a claim for damages in excess of $10,000 or risk
dismissal from the class.' 8 While such a requirement would appear to have
effectively restricted the viability of environmental class actions for damages,
an alternate method might be practically employed -to obtain jurisdiction over
the class: a court might well assume jurisdiction over a claim for injunctive
relief, and subsequently exercise its ancillary jurisdiction to hear a claim for
damages arising out of the same facts, regardless of the amount in controversy
that the courts should liberally evaluate environmental
Rule 23. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91,
General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 287-88 (N.D.
(7th Cir. 1972); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309
1969),
12. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
-

13.

U.S. -,

94 S. Ct. 505, -

L. Ed. 2d -

rights in the context of Federal
98 (1972); accord, Chicago v.
I11.1971), alf'd, 467 F.2d 1262
F. Supp. 354, 356 (N.D. Ohio

(1973), aff'g 469 F.2d 1033 (2d

Cir. 1972).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) ($10,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement
in federal question suits); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) ($10,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement in diversity suits).
15. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
16. Snyder had no effect on federally created claims (federal questions), so that the
small claimant rationale continues to have validity in, for example, class actions for
damages under the antitrust and securities fraud statutes.
17. In an action brought for injunctive or declaratory relief under FED. R. Crv. P.
23(b)(2), the class members are seeking no monetary damages and the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement is often found to be of small consequence in obtaining jurisdiction.
18. Zahn v. International Paper Co., - U.S.-, -, 94 S. Ct. 505, 512, - L. Ed.
2d -,

-

(1973).
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of the damages action. 19 Conversely, if at least one of the named class
representatives meets the jurisdictional amount and otherwise establishes
federal question or diversity jurisdiction, 20 the court might hear the entire
case and adjudicate the ancillary claims of the other class members who

21
have no independent jurisdictional grounds.
Ancillary jurisdiction is invoked to prevent piecemeal litigation of related
claims which would otherwise result due to the limited jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 22 The concept is based on the premise that a district court
acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an entirety. As an incident
to disposition of the entire matter, therefore, the court may "possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take
cognizance were they independently presented. ' 23 Furthermore, so long as

jurisdiction is properly obtained and exercised over the subject matter of the

controversy, the court may exercise its ancillary authority as well over issues
collateral to the case, even if these issues fail to independently present a jurisdictionally proper claim. 24 Thus, where a number of litigants seek class
19. See John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nav. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1945)
(action based on nuisance and continuing trespass for alleged siltation of a river by the
defendant's coal mines). The court concluded:
[T]he money damage allegations of the bill are merely a collateral item wh:ch the
District Court can pass upon provided it possesses jurisdiction of the all important
injunctive feature of the litigation.
Id. at 746. In actions primarily seeking injunctive relief, jurisdictional amount generally
presents lesser problems. See generally Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S.
593, 597, 608-610 (1926); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in
the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1964); Comment, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REV. 383 (1963).
20. Several states provide for class actions to be brought in the state forum under
rules identical or similar to the archaic original Federal Rule 23, written in 1941. E.g.,
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210; TEx. R. Civ. P. 42. Such rules either incorporate or assimilate
the inefficient "true," "hybrid," "spurious" distinctions that restricted the functional utility of original Federal Rule 23. Many states provide for class actions only through application of conventional joinder and intervention rules. E.g., CT. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-101, § 52-104 (1960); N.J. CONST. art. VI, § IV, 3 (1971). A few states have
amended their rules to duplicate the new Fedeial Rule 23. E.g., DEL. CHAN. CT.R. 23
(1971). Only in such states can the institution of a class action be as effective and
advantageous as under new Federal Rule 23. See Esposito, Air and Water Pollution:
What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 32,
36 (1970).
21. See generally

7

C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

(CIVIL) §§ 1659, 1756, 1917 (1972).

22. Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 113 (Ist Cir. 1955); see Symposium-Ex-

ercise of Federal Court JurisdictionNot "Specifically" Conferred, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489,
507 (1973).
23. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 9, at 19 (2d ed.
1970).
24. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1036-40 (2d Cir. 1972). aff'd,
U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 505, 513-17, - L. Ed. 2d -, - (1973) (dissenting opinions);
Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108, 113-14 (1st Cir. 1955); see Dugas v. American

Sur. Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428 (1937); Symposium-Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction
Not "Specifically" Conferred, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489, 506-507 (1973).
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action status, jurisdiction over the claims of those class members who do not
satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement as defined in Snyder and Zahn
may nevertheless be exercised through the concept of ancillary jurisdiction.
Similarly, it has been held that a court's ancillary powers may be exercised
over a class failing to establish diversity of citizenship in order to fairly and
efficiently adjudicate questions of law and fact common-to the class. 25
Although the limits of ancillary jurisdiction in the federal courts are not
clear, a connection should exist between the ancillary and principal claims
with regard to common issues of law and fact. The ancillary claim does not
necessarily have to be subordinate; it may be a claim which could have been
the basis for an independent action in a state court. 26 While jurisdiction to
hear the ancillary claim depends on jurisdiction over the principal claim, the
ancillary claim does not have to present issues dependent on or inferior to
the principal claim. Furthermore, while the Federal Rules do not expand
the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts, 27 they provide opportunities
for invoking it in additional unspecified situations and additionally serve to
broaden the scope of a particular action rather than to extend federal power
28
over it.
ESTABLISHING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

Most environmental class actions are brought under diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction, 29 although general federal question jurisdiction does occasionally
exist. 30 The persistent questions that tend to arise in securing diversity jurisdiction are twofold:
25. See Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720, 723 (4th
Cir. 1943); Winegar v. First Nat'l Bank, 267 F. Supp. 79, 82 (M.D. Fla. 1967); Hobbes
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1755, at 548 (1972); Cohn, The New Federal Rules o1 Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1219 (1966).
"[Alncillary jurisdiction exists in order that the court may do complete justice in the chief controversy."
Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn. Elec. Co., 132 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir. 1973).
See generally Symposium-Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdiction Not "Specifically"
Conferred, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489, 507 (1973).
26. Compare Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (2d Cir.
1972), a! 'd, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505, - L. Ed. 2d - (1973) with Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 356 (N.D. Ohio 1969).

27. FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (1970).
28. E.g., Childress v, Cook, 245 F.2d 798, 803 (5th Cir. 1957); Lesnik v. Public
Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944); Foster v. Brown, 22 F.R.D. 471, 473
(D. Md. 1958).

29. A class must establish diversity of citizenship under the provisions of the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
30. If a class desires to proceed under federal question jurisdiction, the matter in
controversy must comply with the provisions of the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970). See generally Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 95 (1972)
(suggesting a federal common law of water pollution); Comment, Illinois v. City of Milwaukee: A Welcome Alternative to Snyder v. Harris: An Answer to the Anti-Aggregation Problem of Class Suits in Federal Courts, 62 Ky. L.J. 211 (1973).
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. there is the problem of whose citizenship can or must be con-

sidered for purposes of ascertaining whether diversity jurisdiction exists.

Second . . . courts are frequently faced with the question whether the

claims of the representative parties or of the entire class may be aggregated in order to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of the
applicable jurisdictional statute. 1
The first of these issues has not yet been conclusively resolved by the
Supreme Court. The general rule, however, both prior to and after the 1966
amendments, is that only the citizenship of the named parties-the class
representatives-will be considered in determining whether diversity exists 3 2
"[I]nasmuch as Rule 23 would be completely unworkable in the diversity
context and its value significantly compromised" by requiring the courts to
consider the citizenship of every member of the class, this conclusion ap3
pears sound.
The class in environmental litigation, however, may encounter a unique
geographical problem in attempting to establish diversity, as the injured
parties are usually clustered near a major facility or worksite of the corporate
defendant. Furthermore, since the federal diversity statute attributes corporate citizenship to the state of principal business activity as well as to the state
of incorporation,3 4 the defendant will often be a citizen of the same state as
that of the class representatives. Nevertheless, most class representatives do
succeed in establishing the candidacy of national corporations for environmental class suits-a fact most likely attributable to the predominantly liberal
attitude that prevails at the federal district court level regarding the construction of diversity requirements in conjunction with the mandates of Rule 23.35
Satisfaction of JurisdictionalAmount

The more difficult problem for plaintiffs in environmental class actions is
that of satisfying the jurisdictional amount requirement, as construed by the
31. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1755, at
548 (1972).
32. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921); Winegar v.
First Nat'l Bank, 267 F. Supp. 79, 81 (M.D. Fla. 1967); Hobbes v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970). There is a statement by Mr. Justice Black in
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-40 (1969), which indicates that he assumes the old
doctrine has not been changed by the 1966 amendments.
33. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1775,
at 551 (1972).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1970).
35. See, e.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), ajf'd,
469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), afi'd, -U.S.

-,

94 S. Ct. 505, -

L. Ed. 2d -

(1973);

Chicago v. General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. 11. 1971), af 'd, 467 F.2d
1262 (7th Cir. 1972), which were both based on diversity of citizenship and dismissed
on other grounds. Cf. Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio
1969) (successful class action to abate air pollution removed to federal court by defendant under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970)).
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Supreme Court in Snyder and Zahn. Prior to the 1966 -amendments class
actions under Rule 23 were divided into three categories cast in terms of jural
relationships and classified according to the character of the right sought to
be enforced. These types of class suits became popularly known as "true,"
"hybrid," and "spurious. '3 6 The "true" class action was one in which the
right to be enforced was joint or common, in that if the possessor of a primary right refused to enforce that right, a member of the class then became
3
entitled -to enforce it.
T In this -type of action the joinder of all interested
38
parties was required.
All class actions that were not "true" were either "hybrid" or "spurious."
The "spurious" action was particularly characterized by the existence of a
common question of law or fact affecting the several rights for which common
relief was sought .3 The label applied to the suit often determined jurisdictional requirements, the binding effect of the judgment, and the application
40
of the statute of limitations.
Most suits against polluters, whether in equity or at law, would have been
characterized as "spurious" since any injured party could sue without joining
other interested parties even though a successful defense might prejudice the
rights of other potential class members. The relevant factor here is that the
claims of members of a "spurious" class could not be aggregated to satisfy
the jurisdictional amount requirement. 41
In 1966 the draftsmen of the new Rule 23 concluded that "[i]n practice,
the terms, 'joint,' 'common,' etc., which were used as the basis of the Rule
23 classifications, proved obscure and uncertain. '42 Efforts at clarification resulted in a revision which "substitutes functional tests for the conceptualisms
that characterized practice under the former rule."'43 Although new Rule 23
36. These labels were not found within Rule 23 itself, but were coined by Prof.
Moore, chief architect of the original rule. See J. MOORE, 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

§§ 23.08-23.11 (2d ed. 1969); Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised By the PreliminaryDraft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937).

37. FED.R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 23; J. MOORE, 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 23.08 (2d ed.
1969).
39. In Pennsylvania Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. Deckert, 123

F.2d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1941) the court stated:

Spurious class actions . . .were in essence merely a form of permissive joinder in
which parties with separate and distinct claims were allowed to litigate those claims
in a single suit simply because the different claims involved common questions of
law or fact.

40. See Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:. Some Problems Raised By the

Preliminary Draft, 25 GEO.L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937); Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV. 307, 318-21 (1937).
41. Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Pinel v. Pine], 240 U.S. 594
(1916); 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1756

(1972).
42.

ADvIsoRY COMMrrrEE NOTE

98.

43. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEapRAL PRAcTIrE & PROCEDURE (CVIL) § 1753,
at 538 (1972).
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superficially resembles the old rule in that the class must qualify under one
of the three headings of amended Rule 23(b), the three general categories
are now based on the nature of the relief sought, rather than on jural relationships between the parties. 44 Since the new rule omits reference to joint or
common interests, and because its draftsmen specifically repudiated the old
scheme, there was a brief period of uncertainty regarding the non-aggregation
doctrine. Some courts, as well as the draftsmen of the new rule, thought
that the amendment had the effect of redefining the amount in controversy
for class action purposes and therefore concluded that aggregation was possible in those actions that would have formerly been termed "spurious. '45 The
decision in Snyder v. Harris4" effectively refuted this assumption.
In Snyder the Supreme Court revitalized the discarded categories of the
old rule by adopting the pre-1966 standard and holding that claim aggregation is allowed only in suits involving multiple plaintiffs who seek to enforce
a single right in which they have a common interest, that is, only in "true"
class actions. 47 Most environmental class actions for damages will generally
not meet the standard of Snyder because each member of the class will have
suffered a separate wrong, and relatively small individual damages will be
.at issue. 48 The effect of the decision, therefore, is generally to restrict environmental class litigants to injunctive relief, 49 or whatever relief is available
in the state courts.
Although the Court in Snyder reasoned that denying a federal forum to
such plaintiffs was justified since this type of diversity case involves only issues of state law,5 0 it did not consider the practical aspect that state class
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). These new groupings were not intended to be coterminous with the categories of original Rule 23. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1752, at 514-15 (1972).

45. Gas. Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S.
332 (1969); Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Collins v. Bolton,
287 F. Supp. 393, 397 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Booth v. General Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp.

465, 471 (N.D. Ill. 1967); ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 104; Kaplan, Continuing Work
of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
81 HARV. L. REV.356, 400 (1968).
46. 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969).
47. Id. at 336. The Court stated that the discarded "spurious" and "true" categories
were never and are not now the reason for not allowing aggregation of separate and
distinct claims, since the non-aggregation "doctrine is based . . . upon this Court's inter-

pretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in controversy.' " Id. at 336.

It is quite clear,

however, that Snyder forces the district courts to determine whether the interests in-

volved are "joint" or "several" for jurisdictional purposes, "an inquiry that not only fre-

quently is quite difficult but one that supposedly the amended rule is designed to avoid."

id. at 356; see 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL)
§ 1756, at 561 (1972).
48. See Lamm & Davidson, Environmental Class Actions Seeking Damages, 16
ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 59, 87-88 (1971). See also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 316 (2d ed. 1970).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
50. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S, 332, 341 (1969). "Suits involving issues of state
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action remedies are of limited utility, 51 especially where local procedural
52
systems do not adequately provide for maintenance of class actions.
Although the viability of state class actions is limited, 53 several methods
exist to circumvent the restrictions of Snyder that are compatible with the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. First, certain federal question statutes provide for jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy. 4 Second,
as a result of the ambiguity of the categories that characterized old Rule 23,
a court interested in seeing the class action continue due to the existence of
a predominant question or element common to the class may label an essentially "spurious" class action as "true."' ' 5 As a third method, some courts
have allowed plaintiffs to meet the jurisdictional amount by measuring the
amount in controversy from the point of view of the defendant rather than
the plaintiffs. 56 The amount of controversy would thus be measured, for example, by the cost to the defendant of closing a factory or installing expensive
antipollution equipment. This method, commonly referred to as the "defendant's view" doctrine, is particularly appropriate when the class is seeking
injunctive relief.
A fourth method indicates that the limitations of Snyder might be circumvented in some situations by allowing the state to bring an action on behalf
law and brought on the basis of diversity of citizenship can often be most appropriately
tried in state courts." Id. at 341.
51. Discussion and authorities cited note 20 supra.
52. It is generally agreed that "state class action doctrines are presently even less
viable than was the fedeial [class action] provision before Snyder, although there may
remain considerable room for innovation in the state courts." Esposito, Air & Water
Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L.
REV.

32, 36 (1970).

53. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), where Judge
Timbers stated:
Many states discourage class actions and if the individual claims are so small that
suit would have to be instituted in a state court of limited jurisdiction, most likely
the class action device would be unavailable.
Id. at 1040 (dissenting opinion).
54. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(1)(2) (1970) (Clean Air Act Amendments);
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. 1973) (Water Pollution Control Act); 28 U.S.C. § 1337
(1970) (interstate commerce and antitrust matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) (civil
rights). It should be noted that in the private attorney general role citizens are frequently confronted with the obstacle of federal agency noncompliance with federal statutes. See Comment, Environmental Protection: Citizen Action Forcing Agency Compliance Under Limited Judicial Review, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 421, 425-39 (1974).
55. E.g., Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Coker, 219 F.2d 631, 632 (4th Cir. 1955);
Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 276 F. Supp. 96, 101 (D. Minn. 1967).
56. Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 485, 492 (1862); Ronzio
v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940); City of Chicago v. General
Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1971), a/I'd, 467 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1972); see Strausberg, Class Actions and JurisdictionalAmount: Access to a Federal
Forum-A Post Snyder v. Harris Analysis, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 79, 102-107 (1972) (suggesting this approach as the principal way to mitigate the impact of Snyder, particularly

in all federal question cases).
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of its citizens. 57 In West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co.58 a private antitrust
action was brought under Rule 23 by several states against a manufacturer
of antibiotic drugs. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that
recovery by the states could be justified under two theories. The first was
institution of the suit as parenspatriae.5 9 Use of this doctrine is limited, however, to cases in which the state has an interest independent of its citizens. 60

The theory actually relied on by the court involved the state's instituting a
traditional Rule 23 class action on behalf of its citizens. 61 Those citizens having small claims for environmental injury could thus circumvent the Snyder

decision by transferring their claims to the state attorney general. Although
this would prevent personal recovery by the citizens, it would serve the more
important social goal of deterrence by forcing the polluter to internalize the
62
costs of his pollution.
The final means of avoiding the limitations of Snyder and Zahn was sug57. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971); see 7 C. WRIGur & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
(CIVIL) § 1782, at 105-109 (1972).
58. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
59. Id. at 1089. See generally Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945);
Comment, Wrongs Without Remedy: The Concept of Parens Patriae Suits for Treble
Damages Under the Antitrust Laws, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 570 (1970).
60. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945). In Pfizer the state itself
had purchased antibiotics from the defendant drug company and was thus able to meet
requirements of independent interest. Had the state lacked ,this independent claim for
more than $10,000, it could not have used parens patriae to sue solely on behalf of its
injured citizens. As stated in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982 (D. Hawaii
1969), rev'd on other grounds, 481 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 US. 251
(1972),
mhe state's parens patriae claim cannot be a disguised attempt to recover damages
on behalf of the state's individual citizen-claimants. It is not a substitute for a class
action under Rule 23 ....
Id. at 986.
61. West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer &Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. The economic concept of "externalities" has become increasingly popular in attempting to allocate properly the liability for pollution. See Esposito, Air and Water
Pollution: What To Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARv. CIv. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB.
L. REV. 32, 34-36 (1970); Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. GIN. L. REV. 587, 606-12 (1969); McCarthy, Recent Legal Developments
in Environmental Defense, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 195, 201 (1969); Note, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 383 (1969). For example, a food processor who chooses not to treat the noxious
wastes resulting from its operations but instead dumps the sewage into a nearby stream,
as in Ratzlaff v. Franz Foods, 468 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Ark. 1971), produces an example
of what economists call an external diseconomy-a cost of production not borne by the
business activity but by the public at large. This form of public subsidy provides an
economic windfall to many enterprises, distorts the price mechanism, and results in a
misallocation of resources. Society is diverting too many resources into the food processer because his prices do not accurately reflect the total economic and social cost of
his business. See generally Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What To Do While
Waiting for Washington, 5 HAnv. Civ. RwIrrs-Civ. Li. L. REV. 32, 34-35 (1970). It
has been advocated that one of the primary functions of a legal system should be to
force the polluter to internalize all of his costs. Baxter, The SST: From Watts to Harlem in Two Hours, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1968).
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877.

gested in Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Railway,63 a successful federal environmental class action in which the plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive
relief to abate certain air pollution caused by the defendant's operations. The
court kept open the possibility of monetary damages, even after acknowledging that Snyder would not permit aggregation of these claims for less than
$10,000 each, by holding that "there [were] two separate and distinct class
actions involved."6 4 The claim for injunctive relief-was described as the "first
and principal action. 6' 5 The requisite jurisdictional amount for this action
was found on two theories-the mandate for liberal evaluation of the right
to live in a clean environment and the defendant's viewpoint doctrine. 6
Having established the jurisdictional basis for -the injunctive action, the court
turned to the action for damages, and proceeded to exercise its ancillary jurisdiction over the claim. 7 The damages action could not have been heard
by itself in federal court, because the plaintiffs could not have met the jurisdictional amount requirement without aggregation. But since the same
evidence would be presented for the damage claims as for the equitable claim
already properly before the court, the district judge concluded that "this
Court, in the interest of judicial efficiency, will assume jurisdiction over the
entire controversy." 6 8
The rationale underlying the Biechele approach is generally applicable
insofar as it supports the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction by a federal district
court in the proper factual setting. As Biechele demonstrates, so long as the
damage claims arise out of the same facts as the principal injunctive claim,
a court may obtain jurisdiction over the suit for injunction and subsequently
exercise its ancillary jurisdiction over the claims for damages regardless of
the amount in controversy.6 9
A second approach based upon application of ancillary jurisdiction also remains viable after Snyder and Zahn. If at least one of the named representatives of the class meets the jurisdictional amount and otherwise establishes
federal question or diversity jurisdiction, a district court might hear the entire
63. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
64. Id. at 355.
65. Id. at 355.
66. The court held that "the right of each member of the class to live in an environment free from excessive coal dust and conversely, the right of the defendant to operate
its coal loading facility are both in excess of $10,000.00." Id. at 355.
67. Id. at 355.
68. Id. at 355.
69. See John B. Kelly, Inc. v. Lehigh Nay. Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1945)
(action based on nuisance and continuing trespass for alleged siltation of a river by defendant's coal mines).
[Tihe money damage allegations of the bill are merely a collateral item which the
District Court can pass upon provided it possessed jurisdiction of the all important
injunctive feature of the litigation.
Id. at 746; see authorities cited note 19 supra. See generally Symposium-Exercise of
Federal Court Jurisdiction Not "Specifically" Conferred, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489 (1973).
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case and adjudicate the ancillary claims of other class members who have
no independent jurisdictional grounds.70 Although several decisions prior to
Snyder indicated that the claim of each of the representatives must satisfy
the amount in controversy requirement, 71 the view in favor of ancillary jurisdiction extending over collateral claims was recently adopted in Lesch v.
72
Chicago & EasternIllinois Railroad:
[I]n a spurious class action, if one of the representative parties has a
claim in excess of the jurisdictional minimum, then federal jurisdiction
attaches, and if that party alone can adequately represent the entire
class, then there is federal jurisdiction over the entire class action even
where 7members
of the class having smaller claims are originally named
3
parties.
It is interesting to note that although Lesch was decided in 1968, the court
referred to the class action as "spurious," indicating it to be an action in which
any of the parties could sue without joining other interested parties upon
whom the judgment would have a conclusive effect. 74 Professor Wright has
stated that his holding "seems sound and is a natural corollary to other applications of the ancillary jurisdiction concept." 75
Although application of the ancillary jurisdiction concept appears logical
in this context, three federal courts of appeals have rejected the approach
and held that all members of the class must present a jurisdictionally proper
claim. 76 One of these decisions 7 7 was rendered before Snyder; the other two,
City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles 78 and Zahn v. International Paper
Co. 79 were environmental suits decided after Snyder. The Zahn decision, recently affirmed by the Supreme Court, is the more significant and conclusive
of the two.
Zahn involved four owners of lakefront property who sought to bring a Rule
70. See 7 C.

WRIGHT

& A.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

(CIVIL)

§

1756, at 563-68, § 1917, at 585-89 (1972).
71. Newsom v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 173 F.2d 856, 860 (6th Cir. 1949);
Hartman v. Secretary of the Dep't of HUD, 294 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D.Mass. 1968);
see Giesecke v. Denver Tramway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Del. 1949).
72. 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. I11.
1968).
73. Id. at 912.
74. Id. at 912.
75. 7 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1756,
at 564 (1972).
76. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431-32 (D. Vt. 1971), afj'd,
469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd,

-

U.S.

-,

94 S. Ct. 505, -

L. Ed. 2d

(1973); City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948, 953-54 (9th Cir.
1971); Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992, 993 (5th Cir.), cert. de-

-

nied, 389 U.S. 827 (1967).
77. Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 827 (1967).
78. 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1971).
79. 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), afj'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), ajf'd, U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 505, --L.Ed. 2d - (1973).
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23(b)(3) class action on behalf of themselves and some 200 other lakefront
property owners. Under Rule 23(b)(3) damages were sought from a New
York corporation for allegedly polluting the lake with industrial discharges
and impairing the value and utility of plaintiffs' property. Each of the named
plaintiffs alleged that his property had been damaged in an amount exceeding
$10,000, and a total of $40 million was sought in compensatory and punitive
damages. There were no allegations, however, of damages sustained by the
unnamed members of the class. 80 The trial court determined that it was unlikely that every member of the class had a claim in excess of $10,000;81
the issue therefore became whether the claimants who did not satisfy the
jurisdictional amount requirement could have their claims adjudicated
through a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for damages brought by claimants who
did individually satisfy the jurisdictional amount.
In reaching its decision in Snyder v. Harris,82 the Court relied heavily on
the aggregation rule. 3 The majority in Zahn, therefore, read the Snyder
decision to stand for the broad proposition that "[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff
84
who does not must be dismissed from the case .... Although the federal district court in Zahn explained that it felt "precluded" by Snyder from taking jurisdiction over those members of the class
who did not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, 5 it is relevant that
Snyder did not deal directly with this issue since none of the representatives
in that case asserted claims in excess of $10,000.80 The dissent in Snyder
argued, however, that the rule would apply "in all cases where one or more
of the co-plaintiffs have a claim of less than the jurisdictional amount .... 1-87
In Zahn, on the other hand, the four named representatives presented valid
claims that met the amount in controversy requirement, and it appears that
some other members of the class could have recovered similar amounts as
well. 8 The factual distinction is significant inasmuch as one of the principal
80. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1034 (2d Cir. 1972), af 'd, U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 505. 507, - L. Ed. 2d -, - (1973).
81. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971).
82. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
83. Id. at 336. The aggregation rule was stated in Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead
&Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911):
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be
of the requisite jurisdictional amount ....
Id. at 40; see Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939); Pinel v. Pinel, 240
U.S. 594, 596 (1916).

84. Zahn v. International Paper Co., - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 505, 512, - L. Ed.
2d -, - (1973).
85. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431-32 (D. Vt. 1971).
86. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1969).
87. Id. at 343 (Fortas, J.).
88. This supposition is supported by the fact that the defendant contended that
"many members of the proposed class fail to meet . . . jurisdictional amount . .. ."
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considerations that led the Court to affirm the non-aggregation doctrine in
Snyder was a need to reduce the "burdens of an already overloaded federal
court system." 9 If Snyder had allowed aggregation when none of the class
members could individually have come into the federal courts, it would have
provided plaintiffs a means to circumvent the jurisdictional amount requirement and perhaps appreciably increase the federal courts' caseload. Conversely, in Zahn the four named representatives and all other plaintiffs who
allege the jurisdictional amount must be allowed to go to trial in federal
district court. Their former fellow class members must duplicate all of the
evidence in state court. The Zahn extension of the Snyder rationale is thus
unnecessary and impractical. It does not lessen the burden on the federal

judiciary, but it does promote expensive and time-consuming duplicative litigation in the state courts. 90

Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Zahn, asserted that application of ancillary jurisdiction is appropriate in Rule 23 (b) (3) class actions. 9 ' Since the
crucial issue in Zahn involved the extent of jurisdiction over claims of the
various class plaintiffs as opposed to the question in Snyder concerning mere
aggregation of such claims, it is apparent that the alternative approach of ancillary jurisdiction was a viable and proper path for the district court to have
considered. Such an approach would have permitted the court to entertain
the unnamed plaintiffs' claims, but would not have made such considerations
92
mandatory.
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 431 (D. Vt. 1971) (emphasis added),
as well as by the court's discussion of the possibility of a class defined as all plaintiffs
in the named class having $10,000 in controversy. Id. at 433.
89. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
90. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1972); see Note,
9 Hous. L. REv. 852, 857 (1972).
91. Zahn v. International Paper Co., - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct. 505, 515 - L. Ed.
2d -,(1973).
92. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the Court recognized
the power of the federal courts to adjudicate pendent or ancillary claims without independent grounds of jurisdiction. The Court held that the exercise of federal question
jurisdiction over the action empowered the district court to adjudicate a companion state
claim by means of pendent jurisdiction, even though no independent basis for federal
jurisdiction over the state claim existed. Id. at 724-26. The requirement was established that plaintiff's claims must be of the type which would ordinarily be litigated in
one judicial proceeding, and that the claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact." Id. at 625.
Pendent jurisdiction involves the joinder, at the discretion of the court, of federal and
state claims where necessary to fully adjudicate a cause of action. Original jurisdiction
resting under the federal claim extends to any non-federal claim against the same defendant if the federal question is substantial and the federal and non-federal claims constitute a single cause of action. Fullerton v. Monongahela Connecting R.R., 242 F.
Supp. 622, 626 .(W.D. Pa. 1965); see Symposium-Exercise of Federal Court Jurisdicton Not "Specifically" Conferred, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 489, 513-14 (1973).
Although it is generally held that a federal court does not have jurisdiction in a diversity case if any plaintiff is a citizen.of the same state as any defendant, Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), it is significant that the Supreme Court.has
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. It is plain that ,the class action caseload would rapidly become unmanageable were this standard to be applied to all related claims without discretion.
The dissent in Zahn recognized this problem:
[T]he questions of law or fact common to the members of the class [as
required under Rule 23(b)(3)] [must] predominate over any ques-

tions affecting only [individual] members, to guarantee -that ancillary
jurisdiction will not become a facade hiding attempts to secure federal
adjudication of nondiverse parties' disputes over unrelated claims ...
[Tihe practical reasons for permitting adjudication of the claims of the
entire class are certainly as strong as those supporting ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims and parties that are entitled to
93
intervene as of right.
The dissent. emphasized that the class action is a necessary device for full
and complete adjudication of questions of law or fact common to multiple
parties, the unfavorable alternatives being "joiner of the entire class, or re94
dundant litigation of the common issues."
Although -the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction necessarily results in an increased burden on the federal courts since a greater number of claims -are
adjudicated, such an objection is applicable to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in any context. Furthermore, unless a class action is permitted to
proceed as such, many claimants will be unable to obtain any federal determination of their rights. The problem is compounded in view of the absence
of effective remedies at the state level due to inadequacy of the procedural
mechanisms for handling class actions.9 5 The denial of ancillary jurisdiction
sustained ancillary jurisdiction over the non-appearing members of a diversity class action who failed to meet the diversity of citizenship requirement. The judgment was rendered prior to the creation of the Federal Rules, the class action involved being pursuant
to Rule 3 of the Equity Rules. In Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356
(1921), the Court distinguished between named plaintiffs and the unnamed members of
the plaintiff class on the issue of diversity of citizenship. It held that the diversity requirement was satisfied, and that the district court had jurisdiction, as long as the named
plaintiffs in the class were citizens of states other than that of the defendant. Id. at
366-67. This was true even though some unnamed members of the class were citizens
of the same state as the defendant.
Without specifically addressing the issue, the majority in Zahn refused to extend ancillary jurisdiction over non-appearing class members who, although cumulatively sustaining property damage far in excess of $10,000 as a class, failed to individually meet
the jurisdictional amount requirement, while stating there was no doubt that the rationale
of Snyder controlled Zahn. Zahn v. International Paper Co., - U.S. -, -, 94 S. Ct.
505, 511-12, - L. Ed. 2d -, (1973). In his dissent, Mr. Justice Brennan found
it difficult to understand why the Court felt free to ease the diversity requirement, which
has constitutional roots, but not the purely statutory amount in controversy requirement.
Id. at-,
=--,
94 S. Ct. at 511, 516, - L. Ed. 2d at -, -.
No explanation was given
by the Zahn majority explaining why the Ben-Hur approach would not be equally suitable for the matter in controversy issue.
93. Zahn v. International Paper Co., - U.S. -,
-,
94 S. Ct. 505, 514-15, - L.
Ed. 2d -,
- (1973), citing in part FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
94. ld. at -, 94 S.Ct. at 515, - L. Ed. 2d at.
95. The dissent in Zahn emphasized the problem:
Many states discourage class actions and if the individual claims are so small that
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also imposes increased burdens on the state and federal judiciary as a whole
by necessitating duplicative litigation :and by substantially impairing the
ability of prospective class members to assert their claims.
PROCEEDING UNDER RULE

23

Rule 23 clearly confronts the environmental class plaintiff with distinctive
jurisdictional hurdles that are, nevertheless, generally amenable to application of ancillary jurisdiction. The rule also presents significant procedural
difficulties that are peculiar to diversity class actions. The possibilities for
a court to exercise its ancillary authority over jurisdictionally insufficient
claims are greatly enhanced if the procedural aspects of Rule 23 can be
shown to apply comprehensively to the environmental complaint. Once the
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, the environmental class plaintiff
must fit his action within one of the three categories of Rule 23(b) and
satisfy its conditions. 96
Rule 23 (b)(1)
Class actions may be brought under the first category, Rule 23(b)(1),
when their use will eliminate undesirable effects that might result from nonclass suits brought by or against individual class members.9 7 Actions brought
under subsection (b) (1) might be classified as "protective" class 'actions.
Subsection (b) (1) is further divided into subsection (A), designed to protect
the party opposing the class, and subsection (B), which provides for a class
action when the rights of class members not parties to the original action
might otherwise be jeopardized. 98 Subsection (b) (1) (A) provides that a
class action may be brought when the prosecution of separate actions creates
a risk that incompatible standards of conduct might be established for the
party opposing the class. 99 Accordingly, it has been urged that actions for
money damages should not qualify under subsection (b) (1) (A) because the
payment of damages to members of a class does not create "incompatible
standards of conduct" within the meaning of that limitation:
This phrase implies that the separate judgments will affect an opposing
party's continuing course of conduct brought into issue by the suits and
not that the judgments will cause inconsistent isolated actions. In the
damages example, the payment or nonpayment of money damages are
suit would have to be instituted in a state court of limited jurisdiction, most likely
the class action device would be unavailable.
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1972). See also discussion and authorities cited note 20 supra.

96.
23(b),
97.
98.
99.

The action must meet the requirements of one of the three subsections of Rule
23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(I).
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B).
FED, R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A).
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single inconsistent actions which may not affect the party's continuing
course of conduct.1 00
Furthermore, to the extent that an environmental class action is brought under the premise that the class members individually are financially unable
to prosecute their grievances, the corresponding risk that individual suits
would establish incompatible standards of conduct is reduced. 1 1
Subsection (b) (1) (B) permits a class action when a judgment in a nonclass action involving a member of the class would, as a practical matter,
jeopardize the interests of class members not parties to the suit. 10 2 Except
in limited instances when claims are made by many persons against a fund
insufficient to satisfy all claims, damage claims are unlikely to qualify under
subsection (b)(1)(B). 103 Therefore, it is improbable that environmental
class actions will fall within the parameters of either (b)(1)(A) or (b)

(1) (B) .104

Rule 23(b)(2)
While the environmental class action faces a small likelihood of success
under subsection (b)(1), the reverse is true under the second category of
Rule 23(b), subsection (b)(2), which might well be referred to as the
"injunctive subsection." A class action under this subsection arises when "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable ,tothe class ...."105 In other words, a subsection (b) (2) suit is appropriate when the remedy applicable is "final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief. ....,'06 While the subsection does not preclude the
awarding of damages, the Federal Rules Advisory Committee was careful to
state that a subsection (b)(2) action was not appropriate when "final relief
relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.' 10 7
The practicability of bringing a class action under subsection (b)(2) may
appear questionable since one plaintiff can sue just as effectively as a class
when seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief. Considering the fact that
the subsection (b)(2) plaintiff risks final defeat for the entire class, as no
provision exists to allow other subsection (b)(2) class members to exclude
themselves from the class, the utility of class suits seeking injunctive relief
100. Sabbey, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C.
539, 540-41 (1969).

IND.

& COM. L.

REV.

101. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968), criticized in

Note, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 198, 201-202 (1969).
102. FED. R.Civ. P.23(b)(1)(B).
103. ADVISORY CoMmIrrTEE NoTE 101.

104. See Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18
24 (1970).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
106. Id.

KAN.

L. REV. 811, 823-

107. ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 102.
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would seem to be marginal. Nevertheless, a number of reasons can be advanced in support of the usefulness of subsection (b)(2) class actions. 10 8
In a pessimistic assessment of the usefulness of the injunctive subsection
for sustaining ancillary jurisdiction over the class in environmental litigation,
a recent commentator concluded:
Indiscriminate selection of [subsection (b) (2) 1 . . . invites time-con-

suming objections by defendants eager to stall. More significantly, it
also encourages adverse determinations by hostile judges, who are sometimes only too glad to cloak substantive dismissal in the garb of
procedural defect. 10 9
Despite this assessment, at least three recent suits to enjoin activities in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act have succeeded. 1 0 Each was
based on Rule 23(b)(2), and each was aimed at a specific and limited
objective."' The outcome of these suits indicates that the possibilities for
108. One obvious reason is the sharing of the costs of litigation: a single plaintiff
might not be able to afford the expense of pressing his claim if, for example, a corporate
defendant is permitted to contest his liability with each claimant individually. Furthermore, protection of the plaintiff with a small claim has long been recognized as a justification for the class action device. Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F.2d 84, 90 (7th
Cir. 1941). This justification has been recently recognized in an environmental class
action:
The policy reasons for permitting the conservation groups to represent the interests
of their members in a class action are compelling. Any other rule would have the
practical effect of preempting many meritorious actions, as one individual, or a
small number of individuals, would have to sustain the entire financial burden of
the lawsuit.
Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 110-11 (D. Alas. 1971).
The subsection (b) (2) action also gives the class plaintiff a psychological advantage
as compared to the individual plaintiff, based on the notion that there is strength in
numbers. See Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
BUFFALO L. REV. 433, 435 (1960).
The scope of the action, if brought on a class basis,
together with the realization by the defendant of plaintiffs' financial ability to sustain
litigation and their seriousness of purpose, may very well put the defendant in a position
in which the possibilities for settlement or compromise are greatly increased.
..
Another reason supporting the use of the subsection (b) (2) class action for injunctive
relief rests on the likelihood that such actions are more likely to call attention to the
alleged environmental wrong and are thus more probable to elicit public support for the
action. See Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure,
49 B.U.L. REV. 407, 408 (1969); Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit: Traditional
Doctrines & Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1085, 1098
(1970). Public reaction in the form of outside aid consisting of amicus curiae briefs
submitted by informed and influential parties and environmental groups, as well as concurrent financial backing from such parties, may well be the result of publication of the
"cause" of the class action.
109. Comment, The Viability of Class Actions in Environmental Litigation, 2 ECOL.
L.Q. 533, 564 (1972).
110. Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971); Harrisburg Coalition v.
Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F.
Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971).
111. In Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971), the court enjoined the
construction of an interstate highway through the campus of the University of South Dakota. It found that failure of the Secretary of Transportation to file an environmental
impact statement as required by the National Environmental Protection Act § 102(2) (c)
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success directly correspond to the degree of selectivity exercised by the class
representatives in presenting only those issues that are common to the
class." 2 Where the class representatives succeed in invoking general diversity jurisdiction under subsection (b)(2), the possibilities for achieving application of ancillary jurisdiction over the remainder of the class are correspondingly increased.
Rule 23(b)(3)
While a class pursuing injunctive relief will normally cast its action in terms
of Rule 23(b)(2), a class seeking damages will ordinarily frame its action
under the third category of Rule 23, subsection (b) (3 ).113 Although Rule
23(b)(3) is potentially the most valuable of the three categories for protecting the environment and the rights of small-claims plaintiffs from the standpoint of damages, its promise in this context has been significantly impeded
as a result of the restrictive interpretation given the jurisdictional amount
requirement in Zahn v. International Paper Co." 4 There -the Court ruled
that every member of a proposed Rule 23(b)(3) class action based on diversity must meet the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement, and those who
do not risk dismissal from the class." 6 A consonance of opinion emerged
between Supreme Court and circuit court dissenters on the question of aggregation of damage claims, emphasizing the majorities' indifference to the imperative need for modernization of the class action. 1 6 The dissents deplored
the majorities' disregard for the merits of judicial efficiency, asserting that
the exercise of diversity jurisdiction over the class, supported by implementation of ancillary jurisdiction over individuals not presenting sufficient money
claims, would have achieved just and proper ends through a single adjudica17
tion in the interests of judicial efficiency.'
(1969), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), was a refusal to act on grounds generally applicable
to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief. Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F.
Supp. 1364, 1368-69 (D.S.D. 1971).
112. In Nolop v. Volpe, 333 F. Supp. 1364 (D.S.D. 1971), the court emphasized that
[tihe plaintiffs fulfill all of the Rule 23(a) requirements . . . . [T]he class is
so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The applicability of the
National Environmental Policy Act . . . is common to all members of the class and
the claims are typical of the entire class. . . . The common questions of fact and
law predominate and therefore a class action will best aid a fair and efficient adju-

dication of the controversy.
Id. at 1366-67.

113. FED. R. COv. P. 23(b)(3).

U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505, - L. Ed. 2d - (1973).
115. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 512, - L. Ed. 2d at-.
116. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972). Judge Timbers, outspoken in his opposition to the anti-aggregation rule, emphasized in his dissent
114. -

that
[t]he majority's decision . . . disregards the development of a sound doctrine for

more efficient and economical judicial administration andseverely impairs the efforts of those who would modernize the federal law of class actions.

Id. at 1040.
117.

Zahn v. International Paper Co., -

U.S.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol6/iss4/8
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In order to avoid the effects of Snyder and Zahn which would result in
a denial of the right to proceed as a subsection (b)(3) class, it is necessary
(1) to structure the action in such a way "that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,"" 8 and (2) to demonstrate "that a class action
is superior to other available methods [of adjudication.])"1 19 Predominance
does not call for a quantitative evaluation of the time necessary to litigate
the common questions as opposed to those questions that must be resolved
individually for each class member.' 20 Rather it presupposes that the class
representatives should establish a "common nucleus of operative fact" or a
common course of conduct 1 2 1 toward the class on the part of the defendant.
12 2
The action could then proceed under Rule 23(b)(3).
Ed. 2d -, - (1973). Mr. Justice Brennan concluded in his dissent that "[iln view
of the Court's previous concern with practical realities in both its cases involving class
actions . . . I think that this [jurisdictional amount] limitation is both unwarranted and
unwise."

Id. at -,

94 S. Ct. at 517, -

118. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)

L. Ed. 2d at -.

(emphasis added); see Zahn v. International Paper

Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1037-39 (2d Cir. 1972), afI'd,
16, - L. Ed. 2d -, - (1973).

-

U.S.

-,

-,

94 S. Ct. 505, 512-

119. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
120. A most emphatic rejection of the quantitative test occurred in Minnesota v.
United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn. 1968), where the court, in an antitrust case, reasoned:
[Ilt is true that as a class action more time in toto will be spent in proof of individual damage clams

. . .

than will be spent in proof of conspiracy .

. .

.

[I]t would

seem, however, that the situation should be considered and compared to that which
would exist were no class action to be allowed. So for instance, if there were to
be but a single case for trial, the court would expect that the great bulk of the time
of that trial would be consumed with proof or the attempted proof of the existence
and effect of a conspiracy and that the fraudulent concealment and damage issues
would be far less predominant in the sense of time consumed at trial. Were there
to be 500 separate suits, this same pattern undoubtedly would prevail as to each.
It seems specious and begging the question to say that if these 500 law suits were
brought into a class so that proof on the issues of conspiracy need be adduced only
once and the result then becomes binding on all 500, that thereby the common issue
of conspiracy no longer predominates because from a total time standpoint, cumulatively individual damage proof will take longer.
Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
121. The phrase "common nucleus of operative fact" was first coined in Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). Although
it was probable that defendant had made differing oral misrepresentations to numerous
purchasers of his securities, the court found questions relating to the omission of certain
material facts to be common to all of these misrepresentations. The court concluded,
"Consequently there does exist as to the totality of issues a common nucleus of operative
facts such as would justify allowing the class action to proceed under . . . Rule 23."
Id. at 99; accord, Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 488 (N.D.
Il1. 1969) ("a common core of questions").
The application of this "common nucleus" test appears to be quite analagous to the
test for the finding of pendent jurisdiction announced in UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 (1966), from which the key words were taken. See, e.g., Epstein v. Weiss, 50
F.R.D. 387, 393 (E.D. La. 1970); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 489 (E.D.N.Y.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970).
122. Except for Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 145-47 (6th Cir. 1968),

which arose before the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, only Biechele v. Norfolk & W.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

21

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 6 [2022], No. 4, Art. 8

1975]

COMMENTS

The problem that faces the subsection (b)(3) litigant in attempting to
show predominance is demonstrated by In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution
Control Equipment. 23 Plaintiffs there alleged an unusual type of antitrust
injury-"injury resulting from pollution caused by the conspiracy to hinder
and delay the research, development, manufacture and installation of effective motor vehicle air pollution control equipment.' 1 24 The alleged conspiracy was, in effect, "a conspiracy to maintain a public nuisance-smog.' 12 5
Even though the court recognized that the conspiracy was a question common
to all of the classes involved in the action, it refused to find that the issue
of conspiracy predominated over the individual issues of "impact" (smogproduced injuries) and "damages."'1 26 Since the alleged smog-produced injuries would be "as varied as the public itself," the court held that "impact"
and the amount of damages were issues that should be individually liti27
gated.1
A similar problem was resolved in an identical manner in Diamond v.
General Motors Corp.,128 a class action brought in the state courts of California. The plaintiffs purported to represent a class composed of all the citizens residing in Los Angeles County-over seven million persons-in a suit
against some three hundred industrial corporations and municipalities who
were alleged to have polluted the atmosphere of the county. The crux of
plaintiffs' case was that the defendants were maintaining a public nuisance;
under California law, however, a private person could maintain an action for
a public nuisance only if it were "specially injurious to himself.' 1 29 In evaluating the difficulties that would arise in trying to resolve special damages issues
in a class setting, the court in effect summarized the major problem that the
subsection (b)(3) plaintiff must overcome in federal court any time he seeks
damages:
Whether an individual has been specially injured in his person will depend largely upon proof relating to him alone - going to such matters
as his general health, his occupation, place of residence, and activities.
Whether a parcel of real property has been damaged will depend upon
its unique
characteristics, such as its location, physical features and
13 0
use.

These questions must be affirmatively resolved as being common to the class,
not unique to the individual, in order to maintain a favorable position for
Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 359 (N.D. Ohio 1969), provides a favorable precedent for finding
predominance under subsection (b)(3) in class actions for damages.
123. 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
124. Id. at 404.
125. Id. at 404.
126. Id. at 404.
127. Id. at 404-405.
128. 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 642 (Ct. App. 1971).
129.

CAL.

CIv. CODE

§

3493 (West 1970).

130. Diamond v. General Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 643 (Ct. App. 1971).
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the application of ancillary jurisdiction to the members of the class.
A pivotal area concerning the significance of predominance in obtaining
ancillary jurisdiction was dealt with in Biechele v. Norfolk & Western Rail-

way,"" involving the pollution of plaintiffs' land by defendant's coal storage
and loading facilities. Common questions were held to predominate even
though it was obvious that if the defendant were found liable, the court would
be faced with several hundred separate claims for damages.' 3 2 Although
most of the claims would be of a similar nature-the cost of cleaning up the
personal property on which the coal dust accumulated-the opinion of the
court does not support the suggestion that only a common and limited scope
of damage recovery was being considered:
The factual conclusion is inescapable that the plaintiffs were injured in
various respects, and to various extents, in their real estate, their personal property and effects, and in their persons by large quantities of
coal1 3dust
blown from the shipping and storage facilities of the defend3
ant.
It is important to isolate those issues in Biechele by which the case was
allowed to proceed as a class action. If a court can readily ascertain the
common issues in a cause of action, it will be more likely to exercise its ancillary authority. In Biechele a dichotomy was established by the fact that the
defendant was held liable for individual as well as joint class damage claims;
clearly the liability of the defendant was the major area found by the court
to be common to all members of the class. It is equally evident that the
amount of damages had to be individually determined for each class member.
The remaining subsection (b)(3) issue was that of causation or "impact."'11 4 The court attempted to handle part of the causation issue as a common question. The plaintiffs had been permitted to show the various types
of damage which could be caused by "airborne coal dust."'13 5 The use of
expert testimony to delineate the scope of actual causation was important in
that it reduced the scope of inquiry of the special master appointed to determine damages. Plaintiffs were thereby left in such a position that, individually, they had to show only that they were in fact injured and the amount
of the injury.' 30 The question of whether defendant's conduct could have
caused plaintiffs' injuries was determined largely as a common question.
The innovative manner in which Biechele handled the problem of actual
131. 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
132. Id.at 355.
133. Id. at 357.
134. "Impact," as the term was employed in In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970), refers to the direct injury caused by the
alleged wrong practiced by the defendant, as opposed to damages resulting therefrom.
Id. at 404.
135. Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 357 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
136. Id.at 358.
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causation can be utilized in other types of pollution cases in which the effects
of the pollutant on property and persons is determinable through expert testimony. Plaintiffs can maintain predominance by formulating their complaints
into distinct subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4) when the effects of the pollutant
fall into specific categories. 1 37 Even where causation cannot be determined
as a common issue, plaintiffs may still convince the court that a class action
on a particular issue-the defendant's liability- will result in a considerable
saving of judicial time, effort, and expense. Where the court is uncertain
as to whether common questions predominate or a class action on a particular
issue is appropriate, the plaintiffs may seek a "conditional order" that the
action is maintainable, subject to a later alteration or amendment by the court
striking the class action portion of the complaint if it becomes clear that common questions do not predominate or that the action is unmanageable.'13 The
conditional order affords the class representatives the opportunity to enter a
plea for the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the class members whose
individual claims are of an insufficient amount. The corollary effect of
strengthening the argument for predominance is thereby brought about by
the creation of an opportunity for presenting the individual members' claims
as the predominant claim.
Directly related to the issue of predominance is the requirement of
superiority of the class action. If it can be demonstrated that a class action
in the particular case is "superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy," the favorable possibilities for ancillary jurisdiction to attach will be multiplied.' 39 The thrust of the
superiority determination "requires the court to make a determination that
the objectives of the class action procedure really will be achieved in the
particularcase."' 40 The court must also consider any other possible methods
by which the representative plaintiffs might proceed. Among the alternatives
to the class action are individual actions, the test case, and multidistrict consolidation. In most environmental class actions, however, the search for substitutes will be fruitless; the alternatives will be either a class action or no
relief at all.
137. In addition to increasing the manageability of the action, division into subclasses
naturally facilitates the presentation of common questions that may be sustained by the
court. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides that "[aln order under this subdivision may
be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits." See
FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(d).

139. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
140. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1779,
at 59 (1972) (emphasis added).
[Tihe court must initially consider what other procedures, if any, exist for disposing of the dispute before it. It then must compare the possibilities to determine
whether Rule 23 is sufficiently effective to justify the expenditure of the judicial
time and energy that is necessary to adjudicate a class action and to assume the
risk of prejudice to the rights of those who are not directly before the Court.
Id. § 1779, at 59.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol6/iss4/8

24

Lavenhar: The Environmental Class Action after Snyder and Zahn: Obtaining F

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6:866

Generally, the environmental plaintiff seeking damages has a claim too
small to merit individual litigation. If the class action is maintainable such
that the other requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are met, a finding that
it is superior to other means of adjudicating the claim will ordinarily present
no problem 14 and will effectively augment the argument in favor of ancillary
142
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

In a period of increasing concern over misuse and despoilation of the environment, the class action has great potential as a tool to slow the process
of degradation and to make accountable those primarily responsible for environmental harm. Unfortunately, this potential has been frustrated in the
federal courts by the burden of the jurisdictional amount requirement as it
has been interpreted in Snyder v. Harris143 and Zahn v. InternationalPaper
Co.' 44 With the rejuvenation of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction and
141. Id. § 1779, at 61; 3B MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTcE 1 23.45(3), at 23-807 to 808
(1974).
142. It should be noted that an additional requirement-that of notice-must also be
satisfied under Rule 23. The requirement of notice, while greatly overshadowed by such
factors as common manageability problems, requisites for the predominance of common
issues, and mitigation of the jurisdictional amount requirement, carries with it due process as well as manageability considerations such as cost and practicability.
Rule 23(c)(2) requires that class members in subsection (b)(3) class actions be given
"the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort." Rule 23(d)(2) provides for
additional, discretionary notice procedures which the court may utilize in order to protect the interests of the class. These rules, construed in accordance with the recent Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 2140, L. Ed. 2d - (1974), can pose serious practical problems for securities fraud, antitrust
or consumer class action plaintiffs, since Eisen specifically held that "[i]ndividual notice
must be sent to all class members whose names and addresses may be ascertained
through reasonable effort." Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 2150, - L. Ed. 2d at -.
Securities, antitrust and consumer class actions are likely to involve a considerable
number of class members (Eisen involved over six million) making compliance with the
notice requirement prohibitively expensive and thus impractical for most organizational
plaintiffs. The usual environmental class action, conversely, will normally involve a
geographically defined class of limited number, and, as such, the notice requirement imposes no greater burden. Should an impractically large environmental class be formed
it would likely meet with the same problems of manageability as did In re Motor Vehicle
Air Pollution Equip., 52 F.R.D. 398 (C.D. Cal. 1970), and Diamond v. General Motors
Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639 (Ct. App. 1971) (organizational plaintiffs sued in behalf of
all the citizens of Los Angeles County) and dismissal would result.
Had Eisen not been a case of first impression in the area of Rule 23(c)(2) and 23(b)
(3) notice requirements, certiorari would obviously have not been granted and, in this
author's opinion, the case would likewise have been dismissed on the basis of its failure
to comply with the manageability requirements of Rule 23(b). Thus, it appears that
success of the class suit, especially in the environmental context and invoking a court's
ancillary jurisdiction, is more dependent upon the presentation of typical, common and
predominant questions of law and fact brought by a clearly defined, commonly-interested
class desirable of concentrating the litigation of claims in a particular forum.
143. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
144. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505, - L. Ed. 2d - (1973).
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recognition of its potential class action aspects, however, the reasonable construction and application of Rule 23 and the desire of class members to
secure physical rather than monetary relief can combine to preserve the
utility and effectiveness the rule was designed to achieve.
The rule itself is not without fault. Although it purportedly represents a
significant departure from the philosophy and conceptualistic orientation of
the original rule, 145 the old tripartite classification of juristic relationships continues to be employed. The formidable complexity and obscurity of the old
categories were recognized to be the insidious defects of the original rule. 140
Nevertheless, both Snyder and Zahn categorize the interests of class members
thereby indicating a regression to the tradition and pitfalls of the old rule.
By focusing on the identity rather than on the solidarity of interests, whether
for the purpose of determining jurisdictional amount or maintenance of the
suit as a class action, the problem of fashioning an effective group remedy
becomes an increasingly difficult task.
The class action for injunctive relief brought under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2)
is more likely to succeed under the present status of the law. The jurisdictional amount requirement is clearly susceptible to modification through careful application of the concept of ancillary jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also need
be less concerned about the requirements of predominance, manageability,
and best possible notice in class injunctive suits than in subsection (b)(3)
damages actions.
While ancillary jurisdiction can be effectively employed in certain cases to
moderate the demands of the jurisdictional amount requirement, it should be
considered a means to an end rather than an end in itself. The persistently
problematic position of the revised rule and the need for responsive judicial
procedures must be dealt with, either by the judiciary or the legislature. At
the same time it must be recognized that the conflict between the equitable
demands of the environmental class action and the pragmatic dictates of the
overtaxed judiciaries are not necessarily incapable of harmonization. Resolution of that conflict is peculiarly within the congressional domain.
145. 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (CIVIL) § 1752,
at 515 (1972).
146. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 245, 246 (1950); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 380-94 (1967). See also Ford, The History and Development of Old Rule 23 and the Development of Amended Rule 23, 32 ANTITRUST L.J.
254 (1966); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contempoiary Function of the Class Su-t, 8 U.
CHI. L. REV. 684, 707 (1941); Note, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 822 (1946).
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